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The Eurosystem stumbles from crisis to crisis as
politicians seek to rescue bankrupt countries from
their financial distress with huge sums and little suc-
cess. At the same time economists have proposed con-
structive solutions and mechanisms for exiting the cri-
sis (EEAG 2011; Plenum der Ökonomen 2011). Yet
there is no foreseeable progress in this direction and
an end of the crisis is not in sight. Why? It will be
shown in this article that the current political deci-
sions are often constrained by decisions taken many
years ago: history matters. This paper aims to shed
some light on previous decisions that not only shaped
the present form of the euro but also constrain today’s
political action.
An important starting point is the collapse of the sys-
tem of Bretton Woods in 1973 and the institutions
which subsequently emerged. In Europe some coun-
tries adopted an ‘inflation regime’ for their
economies with the intention of using inflation as an
extra stimulus for promoting economic growth, while
others followed a ‘stability regime’ based on stable
prices and a reliable economic framework. The result
was that the former lagged in growth behind the lat-
ter, inducing the inflation regimes to exert a perma-
nent political pressure towards fiscal equalization.
Eventually, however, self-responsibility has proven to
be the least common denominator. So the European
Monetary System (EMS) has emerged as a viable
framework of coexistence between the two antago-
nistic groups of countries. The succeeding ‘euro’ sys-
tem from 1999 up to present, however, has resumed
destructive elements of redistribution in its institu-
tions. Therefore, the old struggle over fiscal equaliza-
tion re-emerged in new forms. It will be shown why
the self-correcting macroeconomic mechanisms were
paralyzed and did not restore fiscal stability but
instead produced huge public debts in some euro
member states. This is why true reform is so difficult
today. Those euro states that once pursued stability
policies are in a minority today and unable to enforce
sound rules of fiscal and monetary policy.
The heirs of Bretton Woods: 
inflation regimes and stability regimes (1973–1991)
On 14 March 1973 the Bretton Woods currency sys-
tem collapsed. European countries were no longer
willing to finance the American balance of payments
deficit and as in the case of Germany to pay
4.00 DM for 1 US dollar. The result was a system of
flexible exchange rates among autonomous states.
But how did the states utilize this newly won free-
dom? More precisely: which interest groups pre-
vailed in this power vacuum? Over the course of
time, two regimes emerged in Europe: inflation
regimes and stability regimes. 
Inflation regimes are marked by strong labour unions,
weak governments and weak central banks. They may
be characterised as follows. 
Labour unions put pressure on public and private
companies by wage demands as well as political,
wildcat strikes. In the case of public companies,
often state monopolies, the government is the
employer. It usually has no other choice than to meet
the wage and job demands and, if tax increases are
not possible, to finance them by running a budget
deficit. If higher unemployment is to be avoided, it
also feels compelled to help private businesses suf-
fering from wage pressure. In order to ensure the sur-
vival of the companies, it provides subsidies and
public contracts that, if tax increases are precluded,
are once more reflected in a rising public debt. To
avoid debt-induced increases in interest rates, the
government tells the central bank (often a depart-
ment of the finance ministry) to expand the money
supply and purchase government bonds. 
As a consequence prices rise, import demand increas-
es, international competitiveness declines and exports
fall, the current account moves into deficit and finally * Humboldt University, Berlin and University of Luzern.the government must devalue the national currency.
The unions feel cheated out of the fought-over wage
increases and start the process anew. There will be an
up and down of inflation and devaluation, upsetting
businesses and impairing long-term growth. 
In stability regimes the unions like any other interest
group are part of a constitutional framework. They
may strike for wage demands but may not use strikes to
push through political goals. Likewise, the government
cannot ask the central bank to accommodate the inflat-
ed public debt. The central bank is independent.
Therefore wages rise in line with labour productivity
and prices remain comparably stable. Stability pro-
motes business investment and economic growth.
After the collapse of Bretton Woods, Germans had
the choice of an inflation or a stability regime. They
opted for a stability regime. Many had lived through
two hyper inflations and lost their savings twice, this
was not to happen again. For them an inflation
regime was not an option. The Bundesbank was to
remain independent of the government budget and
was not to be forced to finance it by money creation.
This decision proved to be right and was copied in
time by Austria and the Benelux countries. From then
on, together they formed the so-called DM block. The
governments of France and the Mediterranean coun-
tries of Spain, Italy, Greece including Portugal had a
different view. They gave in to the demands of the
labour unions, pursued an inflation regime and
accepted the sequence of boom and devaluation that
impaired long-term economic growth.1
The political process leading up to the euro
(1992–1998)
The tensions and speculation caused by the co-exis-
tence of inflation and stability regimes were detrimen-
tal to European integration. In particular the fixed
price system of EU agriculture suffered when individ-
ual countries with an inflation regime had to sudden-
ly devalue. Some began to see a common currency as
a cure for these problems. According to the so-called
Werner Plan – named after the then Prime Minister of
Luxembourg – the EU countries should pursue a
common economic policy out of which a common
currency would emerge.2 To do this, France and the
Mediterranean countries would have to adopt a
German stability regime. But they refused and the
plan soon collapsed due to dissimilar inflation rates
and exchange rate adjustments. 
A new attempt was made by French President Giscard
d’Estaing, who in 1978 convinced German Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt to set up a European Monetary
System (EMS) that would have obligated the
Bundesbank to buy up the other currencies of the
member countries in order to maintain fixed exchange
rates even if the member countries failed to pursue
monetary policy discipline. But the Bundesbank rec-
ognized the manoeuvre and (then still a powerful
institution) vetoed it. 
Instead the European Monetary System was agreed
under the principle of self-responsibility of each
country. The D-mark formed the ‘anchor’ vis-à-vis the
two (or more) countries and intervened when the lim-
its of a fixed exchange-rate band were reached. In
fact, however, the Bundesbank determined the policy
to be followed by the other countries. For example,
France had to raise its interest rates in the 1980s in
order to keep the exchange rate to the D-mark con-
stant. Understandably, France disliked the dominance
of the Deutsche Bundesbank. In 1988 it made a move
for taking economic and monetary policy out of the
hands of one country – Germany – and putting it into
the hands of all EU countries. But how was this to
happen? As an answer, the German government
together with the Bundesbank proposed the creation
of a common currency (the future euro) with a com-
mon monetary policy in a common central bank.
Membership, however, was to be limited to those
member states that beforehand fulfilled the conver-
gence criteria regarding price stability, budget equilib-
rium, exchange-rate stability and long-term interest
rates. Furthermore, the national economic policies
were to be harmonized. The Bundesbank wanted to
establish the currency union only after a political
union with uniform economic policies, i.e. in the dis-
tant future. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl initial-
ly shared this opinion. But he ultimately gave in and
in the Maastricht Treaty of 10 December 1991 agreed,
probably as compensation to France (for its support
of reunification), to 1 January 1999 as the starting
date of the currency union, without any preconditions
(Art. 121 Section 4 EC). With this the solidity of the
convergence criteria was abandoned. Either way, the
currency union had to start on the agreed date and
had to have a minimum number of member states in
order to function. Concessions to the countries with
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inflation regimes were therefore inevitable. In this way
Italy, Spain and Portugal succeeded in becoming part
of the first round of euro countries. 
In order to preserve the solidity nonetheless, two con-
vergence criteria, the stock of debt and the deficit cri-
terion, were determined as permanent criteria at the
1996 Dublin Summit upon the initiative of Theo
Waigel, the then German finance minister. They were
to be adhered to by each country even after its entry
into the currency union and in 1997 were added to the
Treaty of Amsterdam as the Stability and Growth Pact.
After the currency union had been irrevocably estab-
lished, however, the Stability and Growth Pact was not
able to effect much. It was a still birth. In fact, it was
hardly ever seriously applied. When its rules were soft-
ened in 2005, the now more generously defined disci-
pline hardly improved. This permitted the Medi-
terranean countries in fact to maintain inflation
regimes. Instead of devaluing now and then and there-
by making their economies competitive, they accumu-
lated ever higher public debts, which of course was not
sustainable. Although these debts were considered seri-
ous violations of the Maastricht rules, nobody really
wanted to believe that they would eventually lead to
payment defaults and sovereign bankruptcies. 
The contribution of the twin-deficits theory
In the inflation regime of a nation state there is a suc-
cession of inflation and devaluation because the gov-
ernment cannot state credibly that it will withstand
the demands of the unions. Here a system of fixed
exchange rates can help. The government can no
longer use the exchange rate as a way out. All that
remains is the public debt as a possible buffer. 
In that case the macroeconomic standard theories in
the tradition of Ricardo-Barro and of Keynes apply,
according to which in case of a budget deficit self-
correcting mechanisms become effective so that the
public debt does not grow without limit and the bud-
get returns to equilibrium. For the United States, so-
called twin deficits may be observed, i.e. a budget
deficit occurring in parallel with a balance of pay-
ments deficit. Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998) char-
acterize the relationship between the two deficits as
follows: 
The private households are subject to a budget con-
straint, given by the national income 
(1) Y = C + S + T,
or GDP at market prices
(2) Y = C + I + G + NX.
where
Y = national income or GDP,
C = consumption,
S = savings of the private households,
T = taxes minus government transfers,
I = domestic investment,
G = government expenditures on goods and services, 
NX= net exports = (exports – imports).
Combining the two equations (1) and (2) yields:
(3) S + (T – G) = I + NX
The sum of private savings (S) and public savings 
(T – G) on the left-hand side of equation (3) must
equal the sum of investment and net exports on the
right-hand side. 
To net exports NX correspond net capital imports
NKI. It comprises foreign investment at home minus
domestic investment abroad. Here:
(4) NX = NKI
or
(5) S + (T – G) = I + NKI
following equation (3).
By reducing tax revenues paired with constant gov-
ernment expenditures, a budget deficit is created, i.e.
government savings (T – G) decline. There are vari-
ous ways to balance equation (5). According to
Ricardian theory, individuals will increase their sav-
ings. According to the Keynesian approach, they
may also cut back on investment or they may (via
increased imports) try to reduce net capital imports
NKI. The budget deficit is reflected in the balance of
payments deficit and hence creates a twin-deficit
problem. The ensuing decline in the capital stock
will lead to a rise in the marginal product of capital
and the interest rate and to a decline in the margin-
al product of labour and real wages, which will then
trigger self-correcting measures in the area of
investment.A mixed model with a change from Keynesian to
Ricardian behaviour is also conceivable. For euro
countries Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008) have shown
that at a low level of debt, below 80 percent of GDP,
individuals will behave in a Keynesian way when the
budget deficit increases. The level of debt does not
concern them. They utilize the scope created by the
tax reduction and reduce their net capital imports, i.e.
they increase their imports. Along with the budget
deficit, the twin deficit of the balance of payments
grows, initially delaying a self-correction. This paral-
lel effect ebbs, however, at a higher public debt. People
become concerned; the relationship of the budget
deficit to the balance of payments deficit becomes
insignificant in the estimates or in part even reverses.
Therefore savings S must rise more in order to fulfil
equation (5), i.e. individuals start behaving in a
Ricardian fashion. 
Greece already had an official public debt ratio of
about 110 percent at the time of euro accession, i.e. an
amount way above the level of 80 percent calculated
by Nickel and Vansteenkiste. Therefore, one would
have thought, the Greeks should have behaved in
Ricardian fashion and should have increased their net
capital imports through more savings or more
exports. That they failed to do so seems to contradict
the twin-deficits theory. What happened? Evidently
the Greeks assumed from the time of entry into the
euro area that in case of insolvency they would be res-
cued by the community of euro countries. For them
the reference value was not the 110 percent debt to
GDP ratio, but the then average of about 70 percent
of the euro community. Greece therefore behaved in a
Keynesian and not a Ricardian way.
Outwardly, Greece even behaved more virtuously than
required by the theory. Its alleged debt ratio reported
to Brussels fell from the above-mentioned 110 percent
(2004) to 98.4 percent (2008). Therefore, the creditors
assumed that Greece was on the right path. Without
hesitation they could therefore grant the same interest
rate on Greek government bonds as for other euro
country bonds. This explains why interest rate spreads
of close to zero between the government bonds of
Greece and those of other euro countries were
observed (as, for example, presented by Sinn 2010). 
At this time, Spain and Portugal had government debt
ratios that were also way below the 80 percent men-
tioned by Nickel and Vansteenkiste. They, too,
behaved in a Keynesian fashion in conformity with
the theory. With rising government deficits they
increased their imports or reduced their own net cap-
ital imports.
Over time, however, according to the twin deficits the-
ory, in the above-mentioned countries, but especially
in Greece (independent of its ‘officially reported
data’), self-correcting measures should have set in.
With the decline in labour productivity and the rise in
the return on capital, individuals there should have
saved more. This was not necessary, however, as the
high rates of return attracted a large volume of for-
eign capital. Especially German investors were caught
up in the vortex. 
At the same time, the actual Greek public debt kept
rising. But even after the state bankruptcy had become
obvious and the foreign investors stayed away, there
was no reason for Greece to change from the inflation
regime to the stability regime and to reduce its twin
deficits in a Ricardian way. The explanation is that the
foreign investors were replaced quasi automatically by
the Target2 credits of the euro system. The latter were
especially favourable for Greece, as the interest rate to
be paid was only that of the main refinancing rate of
1 percent (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011).
In this way it was possible for Greece as for the other
Mediterranean countries to continue living under the
soft budget constraints of the inflation regime with-
out having to accept the disagreeable side effects of
inflation and loss of purchasing power that normally
come in the wake of an inflation regime.
Who is not automatically reminded of the end phase
of the Bretton Woods System mentioned at the
beginning? At the time Germany refused to continue
financing the US twin deficits by purchasing dollars
at the fixed exchange rate. Germany exited the
Bretton Woods Treaty, caused its collapse and forced
the United States to adopt reform measures. In
today‘s Germany, however, this idea is no longer
opportune.3
Euro, what now? 
Many economists argue for insolvency procedures to
overcome the sovereign debt crisis. But politically this
solution has no chance of being implemented at pre-
sent. With the political forces in place today, the
future is likely to lie in a transfer union under the
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direction of a centralistic euro government (gouverne-
ment économique). Why is this the case?
1. Loss of sovereignty: the days of Bretton Woods,
when Germany stood and refused to buy any more
dollars, are past. In the EU Germany is no longer
a sovereign state. In the council of the heads of
state or government of the euro area, Germany has
only one single vote. Although the body decides
unanimously and Germany could veto every deci-
sion, this alone is not decisive. What is important is
how decisions are formed in the process of ‘deci-
sion shaping’ preceding the vote which produces a
draft that in the end no member can oppose. In this
process the number of votes is often less important
than the number of opinions. France evidently suc-
ceeded in using its standpoint on fiscal equalization
to become the spokesman of the recipient states
and hence had many opinions behind itself. On the
other side there are only Germany and the
Netherlands as safe payer states of any financial
weight. The remaining countries stand in the mid-
dle. With the seriousness of the crisis, the weight of
voters behind the heads of state and government is
also shifting more and more toward those that need
additional rescue programs and thus are in favour
of a transfer union. 
2. The role of the banks in the preparation of deci-
sions: in addition, the decisions of the euro coun-
cil are influenced by institutions that are indepen-
dent of the voters: the EU Commission, the
European Financial Stability Facility, the
European Central Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. In their considerations the bur-
den on the taxpayer is not so important. They are
dominated by bankers. A banker earns less by end-
ing a crisis than on financing it. That is why he is
possibly more interested in extending the crisis
than in ending it. As to assessing what happens
with the money, bankers are less knowledgeable.
That is why bankers are more willing to put
together rescue packages than to say how structur-
al reforms are to be implemented on site. On the
passage of the Greece-II package, it was typically
remarked: what must we do to secure Greece’s
financing until 2020? Much less was said about
how the money was to be used. 
A bright spot in the decisions of 22 July 2011 is
the voluntary participation of banks. Can this
procedure be repeated? I am sceptical. A bank
executive can hardly step in front of his share-
holders and say: I have made transactions at your
expense. He is more in a position to communicate
that a loss arising from a bankruptcy of Greece
of say fifty billion euros must be accepted. After
all, in the past the bank earned good money on
Greek bonds. 
3. Transfer union via the European Central Bank:
politically the simplest is a financing of the trans-
fer union via the European Central Bank. Since
President Trichet has been ignoring Art. 123 of the
Lisbon Treaty, there are no longer any limits here.
The ECB can buy government bonds depending
on the political pressure and political opportunity,
i.e. support the budget of this or the other member
state. Or in the words of Prime Minister
Berlusconi: “and if today it’s our turn, tomorrow
it can be Paris’s turn”.4 Today it is Italy and Spain,
tomorrow perhaps France and other countries.
The actions of the ECB may bring liquidity to the
recipient countries, but the different risks and
hence different interest rates remain. The infla-
tionary effects will be modest as long as the
economies of most euro states produce below their
capacity limits. In Germany, however, which
already produces more closely to the full employ-
ment limit, the inflationary pressure may be
greater. In the same vein, the external value of the
euro may decline when more euros are offered in
the financial markets. 
4. Transfer union via Eurobonds: Eurobonds are
issued by each state in its own name and on its own
account. But the repayment is guaranteed by all
euro states as a common debtor. Whenever a
debtor state declares that it is insolvent, the other
euro countries stand in for it, initially according to
a key of the euro states to be agreed, and eventu-
ally according to the one that is still solvent. If
Germany wants to escape these burdens, it must
declare that it will not participate in the Eurobond
programme. Since the other countries do not want
to lose their most solvent partner, it is more likely
that Eurobonds will be issued via the European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), of which
Germany is a member.
5. Economic Governance: in order to maintain control
of the Union’s finances, the Brussels bureaucrats
are already envisaging a strict economic govern-
ment (a gouvernement économique according to the
French model). At present an expenditure plan with
a common industrial policy is foreseen. In the
longer term, however, a harmonization of the major
taxes in terms of tax base and rates is probably
aimed for. Only with a strict mercantilistic exploita-
tion of the tax substratum can the voluminous
4 Open Europe, 10 August 2011.expenditures of the transfer union be financed and
at the same time indebtedness contained. 
In this way everything will be nicely planned. Only
our freedom will be lost. George Orwell’s (1949)
erstwhile projection for 1984 may perhaps become
reality one hundred years later in ‘Euro 2084’.
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